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1.
PLoS Med ; 20(6): e1004240, 2023 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-20243081

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: Circulation of multidrug-resistant bacteria (MRB) in healthcare facilities is a major public health problem. These settings have been greatly impacted by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, notably due to surges in COVID-19 caseloads and the implementation of infection control measures. We sought to evaluate how such collateral impacts of COVID-19 impacted the nosocomial spread of MRB in an early pandemic context. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We developed a mathematical model in which Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and MRB cocirculate among patients and staff in a theoretical hospital population. Responses to COVID-19 were captured mechanistically via a range of parameters that reflect impacts of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on factors relevant for pathogen transmission. COVID-19 responses include both "policy responses" willingly enacted to limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission (e.g., universal masking, patient lockdown, and reinforced hand hygiene) and "caseload responses" unwillingly resulting from surges in COVID-19 caseloads (e.g., abandonment of antibiotic stewardship, disorganization of infection control programmes, and extended length of stay for COVID-19 patients). We conducted 2 main sets of model simulations, in which we quantified impacts of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on MRB colonization incidence and antibiotic resistance rates (the share of colonization due to antibiotic-resistant versus antibiotic-sensitive strains). The first set of simulations represents diverse MRB and nosocomial environments, accounting for high levels of heterogeneity across bacterial parameters (e.g., rates of transmission, antibiotic sensitivity, and colonization prevalence among newly admitted patients) and hospital parameters (e.g., rates of interindividual contact, antibiotic exposure, and patient admission/discharge). On average, COVID-19 control policies coincided with MRB prevention, including 28.2% [95% uncertainty interval: 2.5%, 60.2%] fewer incident cases of patient MRB colonization. Conversely, surges in COVID-19 caseloads favoured MRB transmission, resulting in a 13.8% [-3.5%, 77.0%] increase in colonization incidence and a 10.4% [0.2%, 46.9%] increase in antibiotic resistance rates in the absence of concomitant COVID-19 control policies. When COVID-19 policy responses and caseload responses were combined, MRB colonization incidence decreased by 24.2% [-7.8%, 59.3%], while resistance rates increased by 2.9% [-5.4%, 23.2%]. Impacts of COVID-19 responses varied across patients and staff and their respective routes of pathogen acquisition. The second set of simulations was tailored to specific hospital wards and nosocomial bacteria (methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producing Escherichia coli). Consequences of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks were found to be highly context specific, with impacts depending on the specific ward and bacteria evaluated. In particular, SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks significantly impacted patient MRB colonization only in settings with high underlying risk of bacterial transmission. Yet across settings and species, antibiotic resistance burden was reduced in facilities with timelier implementation of effective COVID-19 control policies. CONCLUSIONS: Our model suggests that surges in nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission generate selection for the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Timely implementation of efficient COVID-19 control measures thus has 2-fold benefits, preventing the transmission of both SARS-CoV-2 and MRB, and highlighting antibiotic resistance control as a collateral benefit of pandemic preparedness.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Cross Infection , Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus , Humans , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , Cross Infection/epidemiology , Cross Infection/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2 , Pandemics/prevention & control , Infection Control/methods , Anti-Bacterial Agents/pharmacology , Anti-Bacterial Agents/therapeutic use , Hospitals , Drug Resistance, Multiple, Bacterial
2.
Occup Environ Med ; 80(5): 268-272, 2023 05.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2281917

ABSTRACT

OBJECTIVES: To quantify the burden of COVID-19-related sick leave during the first pandemic wave in France, accounting for sick leaves due to symptomatic COVID-19 ('symptomatic sick leaves') and those due to close contact with COVID-19 cases ('contact sick leaves'). METHODS: We combined data from a national demographic database, an occupational health survey, a social behaviour survey and a dynamic SARS-CoV-2 transmission model. Sick leave incidence from 1 March 2020 to 31 May 2020 was estimated by summing daily probabilities of symptomatic and contact sick leaves, stratified by age and administrative region. RESULTS: There were an estimated 1.70M COVID-19-related sick leaves among France's 40M working-age adults during the first pandemic wave, including 0.42M due to COVID-19 symptoms and 1.28M due to COVID-19 contacts. There was great geographical variation, with peak daily sick leave incidence ranging from 230 in Corse (Corsica) to 33 000 in Île-de-France (the greater Paris region), and greatest overall burden in regions of north-eastern France. Regional sick leave burden was generally proportional to local COVID-19 prevalence, but age-adjusted employment rates and contact behaviours also contributed. For instance, 37% of symptomatic infections occurred in Île-de-France, but 45% of sick leaves. Middle-aged workers bore disproportionately high sick leave burden, owing predominantly to greater incidence of contact sick leaves. CONCLUSIONS: France was heavily impacted by sick leave during the first pandemic wave, with COVID-19 contacts accounting for approximately three-quarters of COVID-19-related sick leaves. In the absence of representative sick leave registry data, local demography, employment patterns, epidemiological trends and contact behaviours can be synthesised to quantify sick leave burden and, in turn, predict economic consequences of infectious disease epidemics.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Sick Leave , Adult , Middle Aged , Humans , Pandemics , COVID-19/epidemiology , SARS-CoV-2 , Employment , France/epidemiology
3.
EMBO Rep ; 23(9): e55780, 2022 09 05.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1964754

ABSTRACT

Writing and receiving reference letters in the time of COVID.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Pandemics , COVID-19/epidemiology , Humans , Students , Writing
4.
BMC Infect Dis ; 22(1): 324, 2022 Apr 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1770492

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: COVID-19 outbreaks still occur in English care homes despite the interventions in place. METHODS: We developed a stochastic compartmental model to simulate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 within an English care home. We quantified the outbreak risk with baseline non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) already in place, the role of community prevalence in driving outbreaks, and the relative contribution of all importation routes into a fully susceptible care home. We also considered the potential impact of additional control measures in care homes with and without immunity, namely: increasing staff and resident testing frequency, using lateral flow antigen testing (LFD) tests instead of polymerase chain reaction (PCR), enhancing infection prevention and control (IPC), increasing the proportion of residents isolated, shortening the delay to isolation, improving the effectiveness of isolation, restricting visitors and limiting staff to working in one care home. We additionally present a Shiny application for users to apply this model to their facility of interest, specifying care home, outbreak and intervention characteristics. RESULTS: The model suggests that importation of SARS-CoV-2 by staff, from the community, is the main driver of outbreaks, that importation by visitors or from hospitals is rare, and that the past testing strategy (monthly testing of residents and daily testing of staff by PCR) likely provides negligible benefit in preventing outbreaks. Daily staff testing by LFD was 39% (95% 18-55%) effective in preventing outbreaks at 30 days compared to no testing. CONCLUSIONS: Increasing the frequency of testing in staff and enhancing IPC are important to preventing importations to the care home. Further work is needed to understand the impact of vaccination in this population, which is likely to be very effective in preventing outbreaks.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Humans , Infection Control , Vaccination
5.
Nat Commun ; 13(1): 236, 2022 01 11.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1621241

ABSTRACT

Healthcare facilities are vulnerable to SARS-CoV-2 introductions and subsequent nosocomial outbreaks. Antigen rapid diagnostic testing (Ag-RDT) is widely used for population screening, but its health and economic benefits as a reactive response to local surges in outbreak risk are unclear. We simulate SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a long-term care hospital with varying COVID-19 containment measures in place (social distancing, face masks, vaccination). Across scenarios, nosocomial incidence is reduced by up to 40-47% (range of means) with routine symptomatic RT-PCR testing, 59-63% with the addition of a timely round of Ag-RDT screening, and 69-75% with well-timed two-round screening. For the latter, a delay of 4-5 days between the two screening rounds is optimal for transmission prevention. Screening efficacy varies depending on test sensitivity, test type, subpopulations targeted, and community incidence. Efficiency, however, varies primarily depending on underlying outbreak risk, with health-economic benefits scaling by orders of magnitude depending on the COVID-19 containment measures in place.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 Serological Testing/methods , COVID-19/diagnosis , COVID-19/epidemiology , Cross Infection/diagnosis , Cross Infection/epidemiology , Disease Outbreaks , SARS-CoV-2 , Antigens, Viral , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19/transmission , Cost-Benefit Analysis , Cross Infection/prevention & control , Cross Infection/transmission , Diagnostic Tests, Routine , Epidemiological Monitoring , Hospitals , Humans , Risk Factors , Vaccination
6.
EMBO Rep ; 22(11): e54024, 2021 11 04.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1451019

ABSTRACT

Many people have discovered new hobbies and pastimes during the COVID crisis. David Smith describes how he developed an obsession with rescuing old microscopes.


Subject(s)
Hobbies , Microscopy , COVID-19 , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2
7.
EMBO Rep ; 22(10): e53789, 2021 10 05.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1369947

ABSTRACT

COVID-19 has forced us into social distancing against humans' need for physical contact. Will we return to consensual embrace after the pandemic or still keep our distance?


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Touch , Humans , SARS-CoV-2
9.
EMBO Rep ; 22(4): e52591, 2021 04 07.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1170585

ABSTRACT

As COVID-19 has turned universities into ghost towns, David Smith cannot wait for the day when his campus fills with life again.

10.
Clin Infect Dis ; 72(1): 141-143, 2021 01 23.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1045886

ABSTRACT

To date, no specific estimate of R0 for SARS-CoV-2 is available for healthcare settings. Using interindividual contact data, we highlight that R0 estimates from the community cannot translate directly to healthcare settings, with pre-pandemic R0 values ranging 1.3-7.7 in 3 illustrative healthcare institutions. This has implications for nosocomial COVID-19 control.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Basic Reproduction Number , Delivery of Health Care , Humans , Pandemics
11.
BMC Med ; 18(1): 386, 2020 12 08.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-962808

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: Long-term care facilities (LTCFs) are vulnerable to outbreaks of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Timely epidemiological surveillance is essential for outbreak response, but is complicated by a high proportion of silent (non-symptomatic) infections and limited testing resources. METHODS: We used a stochastic, individual-based model to simulate transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) along detailed inter-individual contact networks describing patient-staff interactions in a real LTCF setting. We simulated distribution of nasopharyngeal swabs and reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) tests using clinical and demographic indications and evaluated the efficacy and resource-efficiency of a range of surveillance strategies, including group testing (sample pooling) and testing cascades, which couple (i) testing for multiple indications (symptoms, admission) with (ii) random daily testing. RESULTS: In the baseline scenario, randomly introducing a silent SARS-CoV-2 infection into a 170-bed LTCF led to large outbreaks, with a cumulative 86 (95% uncertainty interval 6-224) infections after 3 weeks of unmitigated transmission. Efficacy of symptom-based screening was limited by lags to symptom onset and silent asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic transmission. Across scenarios, testing upon admission detected just 34-66% of patients infected upon LTCF entry, and also missed potential introductions from staff. Random daily testing was more effective when targeting patients than staff, but was overall an inefficient use of limited resources. At high testing capacity (> 10 tests/100 beds/day), cascades were most effective, with a 19-36% probability of detecting outbreaks prior to any nosocomial transmission, and 26-46% prior to first onset of COVID-19 symptoms. Conversely, at low capacity (< 2 tests/100 beds/day), group testing strategies detected outbreaks earliest. Pooling randomly selected patients in a daily group test was most likely to detect outbreaks prior to first symptom onset (16-27%), while pooling patients and staff expressing any COVID-like symptoms was the most efficient means to improve surveillance given resource limitations, compared to the reference requiring only 6-9 additional tests and 11-28 additional swabs to detect outbreaks 1-6 days earlier, prior to an additional 11-22 infections. CONCLUSIONS: COVID-19 surveillance is challenged by delayed or absent clinical symptoms and imperfect diagnostic sensitivity of standard RT-PCR tests. In our analysis, group testing was the most effective and efficient COVID-19 surveillance strategy for resource-limited LTCFs. Testing cascades were even more effective given ample testing resources. Increasing testing capacity and updating surveillance protocols accordingly could facilitate earlier detection of emerging outbreaks, informing a need for urgent intervention in settings with ongoing nosocomial transmission.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , Long-Term Care/organization & administration , Public Health Surveillance/methods , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Female , Humans , Male , Mass Screening/methods , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Practice Guidelines as Topic , SARS-CoV-2
12.
EMBO Rep ; 21(7): e50886, 2020 07 03.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-656663

ABSTRACT

For most academics - those who have the privilege - a sabbatical is an opportunity to get a larger project done rather than an excuse to go to exotic places.

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